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Abstract  
Social networking sites capture, store, analyse and exploit personal data resulting in heightened un-
certainty and perceived risk around protecting our personal data.  When this data involves personal 
health information (PHI) the risk factors increase.  These risks can be discovered in both the design 
and presentation of Health Social Networking (HSN) services, as well as the actions of users when 
providing electronic consent (eConsent).  How do users interact with technology and determine the 
potential risks to their PHI data? This paper seeks to explore users’ behaviours and reflections on risk 
taking when registering onto a HSN. Examining users’ registration behaviours, it is possible to ex-
plore users’ risk homeostasis when providing eConsent on a HSN.  This paper focuses on understand-
ing the users’ decision making process to the reading and comprehension of the Terms and Conditions 
(T&Cs), and Privacy Policy (PP) statements. A two-step approach was taken to collecting data, with 
1) the observation of action followed by 2) a focus group discussion. This research sheds light into 
user’s assessment of future risk, the potentially dark side of sharing PHI and the preferred ways of 
operating for the user of these online communities.   
Keywords:  Risk; Decision Making; eConsent; Health Social Networks (HSNs). 
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1 Introduction 
“The updated version of Descartes’s Cogito is ‘I am seen, therefore I am’ – and that the more people 
who see me, the more I am…” (Bauman & Donskis, 2013) 
Information overload has become part of the information revolution, providing end users with a 
greater range and minutiae of knowledge (Sundar, Knobloch‐Westerwick, & Hastall, 2007).  Latterly, 
information overload has been combated by the use of visualisation, aiming at reducing human effort 
and increasing human attention by improving the user’s information processing capacities (Chung, 
Chen, & Nunamaker Jr, 2005; Pirolli, Card, & Van Der Wege, 2001).  Contrary to this, the presenta-
tion of informed consent on electronic platforms (referred herein as eConsent) has remained woefully 
underdeveloped, remaining overly text heavy. The users of Health Social Network (HSN) platforms 
are faced with Terms & Condition (T&Cs) and Privacy Policies (PP) statements that are at least four 
pages long, with heavy technical jargon. This paper aims to explore users’ behaviours when providing 
electronic consent (eConsent) on a HSN.  More specifically, the focus is on user engagement and 
judgement of risk for their Personal Health Information (or lack thereof) based on their interaction 
with the T&Cs and PP statements on the HSN. 
HSNs enable patients/users to share health experiences that can improve their lives – especially those 
diagnosed with chronic diseases (O’Connor & Heavin, 2016). HSNs are a service where users can 
find health resources i.e. emotional support and information sharing with peers, as well as Q&A’s 
with Physicians.  These services are primarily directed at patients to build peer affinities and experi-
ence collective learning (Swan, 2009).  However, prior to using a HSN, users are required to provide 
consent as part of the site registration process. The concept of informed consent was brought into 
medicine through courts and government agencies (Beauchamp, 2011). The purpose of informed con-
sent is to ensure that enough of the correct information is provided to the individual to make them 
aware of the potential risks and benefits associated with participating in a specific research study or in 
using a specific service, and in so doing protecting and assisting them in meaningful choice (McGuire 
& Beskow, 2010).  Users often share vast amounts of Personal Health Information (PHI) on HSNs as 
part of their engagement with the community however, in some cases users are not familiar with the 
HSNs privacy policy to know whether their PHI is safe (O’Connor & Heavin, 2016).  
1.1 Contextual Matters 
On a HSN platform the eConsent process is presented to users as an adhesion contract, offering their 
services on a “take it or leave it” basis – simply ticking agree to continue (Bashir, Hayes, Lambert, & 
Kesan, 2015).  However, this does not fully meet some of the requirements of informed consent as 
proposed by Faden & Beauchamp (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986) in which comprehension and volun-
tariness are important factors.  User comprehension is negated when individuals do not read and un-
derstand the T&Cs and PP statements of the site they are signing up to (Obar & Oeldorf-Hirsch, 
2016) and voluntariness is impeded by the “take or leave it” approach to eConsent offered by the 
HSN (Bashir, et al., 2015).  It is important to note that a HSN registered in a specific jurisdiction is 
governed by that country’s data protection laws e.g. in USA, the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act (HIPPA 1996) regulates private health information (PHI). With the new General Da-
ta Protection Regulations (2018)  due to become law in May 2018 there will be a strong emphasis on 
the transparency, security and accountability of online data use (GDPR, 2017). Yet, questions remain 
as to whether the GDPR (2018) will have data protection jurisdiction over USA based services. 
1.2 Individual Matters 
It can be said that HSN user interfaces are not the only problem when it comes to security and privacy 
risks – user’s level of interaction with technology and their decision making are effected by their 
emotional and cognitive estimation of risk (West, 2008).  Much research in the social sciences sug-
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gest that individuals are often less than optimal decision makers when it comes to judging risk ( 
Adams & Sasse, 1999; Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1986). For instance, in situations of uncer-
tainty in decision making, it was found (Valérie Burri, 2009) that individuals with a limited 
knowledge base would use analogies and personal experiences as tools for reasoning, and choice se-
lection.  There is also evidence that a ‘privacy paradox’ can exist – where there is a discrepancy be-
tween user’s concerns about privacy and their actual online behaviour to protect their privacy 
(Sundar, Kang, Wu, Go, & Zhang, 2013).  Additional research (Sundar, et al., 2013) found that many 
online users’ privacy disclosure behaviours were driven by heuristics (mental shortcuts) rather than 
by estimates of risk versus benefit.  The use of mental shortcuts has long been realised in social cog-
nition – the human as a “cognitive miser” making decisions based on quick and cursory reasoning, 
negating the need for effortful thinking (Morris, Woo, & Singh, 2005). The cognitive miser approach 
allows individuals to simplify complex problems and emphasize efficiency (Kim & Mrotek, 2016). 
Yet, motivation and emotion also play a role in decision making which has led to the view of the per-
son as not just cognitive actors but as motivated tacticians – using cognitive strategies based on goals, 
motives and needs. Sometimes these tacticians choose accurately and adaptively, and on other occa-
sions they choose in the interest of self-esteem or speed (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). 
Often individuals do not believe they are vulnerable to risks online (West, 2008).  Some individuals 
maintain an acceptable degree of risk that is self-levelling, i.e. risk homeostasis (Wilde, 2001).  For 
instance, users who increase their security measures would then be more likely to increase their risk 
behaviours. There are a number of factors that could influence these risk taking behaviours – a lack of 
motivation, the concept of safety being too abstract in the online setting, a lack of immediate feedback 
(delay in consequences), and the amount of user effort involved in evaluating the security/cost trade 
off (West, 2008). There is also evidence in the literature that a range of motives for individual risk 
taking exist including them seeking a sense of power, control, thrill, challenge, escape, or fulfilment 
of other needs (Powell, 2007). Individual’s view of risk may be influenced by psychological, social, 
cultural or institutional considerations (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000). Research 
(Renn, 1998) states that the perception of risk can be affected by intuitive biases such as the signifi-
cance of the information to the person, the events experienced and whether this experience either sup-
ports or refutes prior experience – in the latter case, there would be an avoidance of cognitive disso-
nance (a disparity between one’s belief system and a presenting situation). The view of risk may be-
come downplayed or ignored to avoid the internal tension that cognitive dissonance could create 
(Renn, 1998). In Risk Homeostasis theory everyone is considered to have the ability to take a risk, but 
this varies between individuals (see the work of Slovic, 2016). Risk assessment is conducted by indi-
viduals via an evaluation of outcomes, based on our own experiences or our knowledge on the experi-
ences of others (J. Adams, 1995). Four factors have been identified as determining the level of risk: 
1. The expected benefits of risk behaviours e.g. saving time by ignoring safety measures.  
2. The expected costs of risk behaviours e.g. time and effort to recover from a computer threat. 
3. The expected benefits of cautious behaviours e.g. maintaining confidentiality and integrity of in-
formation. 
4. The expected costs of cautious behaviours e.g. effort in engaging with complicated security pro-
cedures (Powell, 2007). 
In attempts to induce individuals to reduce their risk taking behaviours, proposals have been made 
focusing on three strategies – 1)  persuasion of individuals to change behaviours; 2) the introduction 
of law to impose behavioural change and 3) to provide automatic protection in the product or in envi-
ronmental design (Hedlund, 2000). Other human factors can inhibit the reduction of risk, including 
the optimism bias where individuals believe the level of risk is lower for them than other individuals, 
and the normalization of risk, where individuals learn to accept risk based on a desensitization process 
from prior experiences (Celsi, Rose, & Leigh, 1993).  It is posited (Kearney, Kearney, Kruger, & 
Kruger, 2016) that the concept of risk homeostasis provides rich insights into contradictory human 
behaviour. With Information Technology (IT) there is an application of the risk homeostasis theory to 
users when they engage in the knowing-doing gap or the Privacy Paradox - the discrepancy between 
users concerns about privacy and their actual online behaviour to protect privacy (O’Connor & Heav-
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in, 2016).  A self-levelling risk adopted by users, attempts to prevent the cognitive strain involved in 
decision making, whether under time constraints or overloaded with information e.g. reading lengthy 
T&Cs and PP statements. With these arguments in mind, this research seeks to explore the users’ per-
spective, by asking how and why they took the action to provide eConsent on a HSN, and on what 
basis did they estimate the potential risks for their PHI. The following sections of this paper will de-
tail the research design, the findings and the conclusions exploring the bright or dark side of joining 
an online community. 
2 Research Design 
This ongoing research funded by the Wellcome Trust is in the final phases of a 12-month project. Eth-
ical approval was provided by the Social Research Ethics Committee, University College Cork, Ire-
land. 
An experimental, qualitative approach was taken to the collection of data, with the observation of reg-
istration behaviours followed by focus group discussions. This approach was adopted as it offered the 
potential to explore the “how” and “why” questions as a means of exploring the nuances of users’ 
perspectives when registering to a HSN. A similar approach was employed by Sutanto, Palme, Tan & 
Phang (2013) when exploring the personalization-privacy paradox of smartphone users. Research 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994) suggest qualitative studies allows one to capture the “others” perception 
of an experience. A bottom up – thematic approach was taken to the analysis of focus group data.  
Thematic analysis (TA) offers a method for identifying and analysing patterns in qualitative data.  TA 
has theoretical flexibility as it can be applied within a range of theoretical frameworks, from essential-
ist to constructionist. It is also suited to a range of research interests, research questions and research 
data (Clarke & Braun, 2013).  NVivo provided the qualitative analysis package for the transcripts of 
data collected from focus group discussions.  The data was thematically grouped into pertinent topics 
identified from the participants’ contributions. 
In Step 1 participants were asked to register onto a HSN using mock registration details supplied by 
the research team. Whilst participants undertook this activity, researchers observed their behaviours 
while the participants used mobile devices to register on the HSN.  The experimenter effect - Haw-
thorne (Adair, 1984) - was considered, but due to the nature of the research, observation was consid-
ered a vital part of the design process. 
Step 2 participants were then asked to take part in focus group discussions. These were audio record-
ed and later transcribed.  A total of three focus groups were held.  Participant numbers in each focus 
group were 10:8:6 respectively. 
2.1  Sample 
Twenty-four participants took part in this research. The gender ratio was Male 3:1 Female. Ages 
ranged from 18 to 44 years, with the majority of participants were in the 25-34 age bracket. There is 
the continuing problem in research in using a laboratory setting for the administration and collection 
of data, but Briggs et al (1996) suggests that graduate business students can provide a surrogate for 
“real world” users.  In this study, participants were graduate students from University College Cork, 
Ireland. 
2.2  Coding of Responses 
The focus groups were labelled as FG1, FG2 and FG3 respectively.  Participants within these focus 
groups have been anonymised by using Gender/Number coding e.g. M1, M2 or F1, F2.  When a 
group response or consensus agreement was made within discussions this is coded as FG1 (Focus 
Group 1): GR, the later abbreviation representing “general response”. 
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3 Results 
The observation of participant behaviours during registration onto a HSN revealed that very little time 
was taken to complete the three pages of this process. When participants were asked to provide eCon-
sent at the bottom of the first page on registration, less than 1 minute was taken by participants to 
make the choice to click – agree.  For participants to read and understand the T&Cs and PP state-
ments it would involve clicking a link, redirecting users to different pages on this website. It is quite 
clear from these observations that participants were not information seeking, were not moving onto 
different pages with these details, but simply ticking “agree”. It was apparent that participants were 
not taking into consideration, at any deep level, the potentially negative implications or benefits of 
their decision to join this HSN. 
3.1 Just Click 
Comments made by focus group participants revealed that ‘Just Clicking’ agree was automatic or em-
bedded into their repertoire of behaviours when interacting with computer interfaces requesting con-





Just Click Comments 
FG3:M5 “I always just tick that and never look at it.” 
FG3:M2 “So, used to ticking it at the bottom, so I just tick the box.” 
FG1:F1 “You want to use the app, you are going to use it regardless of the terms and conditions.” 
FG1:M1 “You are going to agree, even if you are not sure about that point, or not sure about this 
point, I think you are still going to go ahead and tick agree. 
FG3:F1 “I always agree” … “if you don’t click it, then you get nothing.” 
FG1:F3 “…you either agree and use it, or don’t agree, and not use it.  There’s no room for negotia-
tion...” 
FG2:M2 “(Ticking Agree) …Yes, it’s a habit.” 
Table 1. The Just Click Agree Habit. 
The unconscious and automatic habit of ticking agree to this HSN could be said to be a form of condi-
tioned learning. Past experiences of engaging with websites had taught users that this step had to be 
completed to gain access, that the conditions offered were non-negotiable. Although users may have 
had or still had concerns over eConsent the decision risk had become normalised, which were evi-
denced in the self-levelling actions. 
3.2 Sharing Risks 
Through discussions on the T&Cs and PP of this website, it became more apparent that participants 
were less comfortable about the potential risks for their personal health information (PHI). A reflec-
tive dissatisfaction emerged on how their PHI data could be used because of joining a HSN. Concerns 
were expressed about who users were sharing their information with i.e. other members as strangers; 
The potential for their PHI to be leaked or hacked; Employers or insurance companies being able to 
discriminate against users based on the health information they supplied to HSNs and; the general 
safety and confidentiality of their PHI on the HSN.  Table 2 provides comments from participants on 
these issues.  The irony being that had participants read the T&Cs and PP statements prior to giving 
eConsent they could have made a more informed choice about joining, and following this perhaps not 
felt “regret” at the decision taken. 
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FG1:F2 “I think you are lulled into a false sense of security … I mean you wouldn’t discuss your 
health issues in a doctor’s waiting room, but you are more than happy to put it in here for a 
community.” 
FG1:M3 “There is a lot of wrong information, misinformation out there, … you know health improve-
ments or thing that improve your health, really they are giving us anecdotal evidence, there is 
no real hard clinical evidence for it.” 
FG1:M4 “In the T&Cs they were absolving themselves from any obligation for false information, … if 
you don’t read it, … you might just think “oh well this person is going through the same thing 
so, it worked for them, so just do what they did.” 
FG1:M3 “You’d want some control over data, otherwise employers might discriminate, or health insur-
ances definitely will.” 
FG1:M5 “Assurances were given about confidentiality … but in the real world I would be very guard-
ed.  I would be a bit concerned about traceability.” 
FG1:M3 “There’s no-one that can guarantee that your data is safe, so it does not matter what they 
promise you.” 
FG1:M4 “The biggest challenge for the 21st Century is personal, how to save your personal data.” 
Table 2. The potential darker risks of sharing PHI data on HSNs. 
Other topics yielded from further discussion highlighted IT literacy and comfortability discrepancies 
among participants. Some participants were more IT confident than others, and had a deeper under-
standing on how personal information could be used and interconnected with other websites / applica-
tions. Participant comments illustrated in Table 3 display views on the realities of inputting PHI 
online, the sharing implications and how links to other website providers could be used as secondary 
data sources by other unknown third parties. Users with this type of internet knowledge were in a bet-
ter situation to manage any perceived security threat (Büchi, Just, & Latzer, 2017; Lee, Tan, & Siah, 
2017).   
 
Participant ID Security and Connectivity 
FG1:M4 “There wasn’t much reference made to inform the user, … it was all hidden inside a legal 
document.” 
FG2:M5 “It’s enough to have a piece of information that is correct … to find everything about you.” 
 “Social, health profile is one component of your profile that big companies are using.” 
 “If I pay Google enough they can sell me your personality.  Your profile, even more infor-
mation than you know about you.” 
FG2:M6 “Joining the dots basically.” 
FG1:M5 “Even down to what you are buying, eating, everything is integrated.” 
FG2:F1 To control Connectivity: 
“I don’t want the intersection.  I would not put a health app on my phone because I don’t 
want the other apps getting access to data to do with health.  So, I look at where they are 
going to intersect and separate them that way.” 
Table 3. The potential dark risks for the secondary use of PHI data on HSNs. 
3.3 User Protection 
The next steps suggested by participants involved providing assurances to users of HSNs, these in-
cluded recommendations for altering the HSN registration process particularly focusing on changing 
the provision of eConsent.  These included:  
 To provide some legal backing to PHI – data protection – and to impose fines on those that do not 
meet these requirements.  
 To offer the user different levels of control over who can access their PHI, and how much of this 
information they are required to share with others.  
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 To make the registration and comprehension of eConsent a more user-friendly process, so that both 
the content and presentation of information is more digestible to a lay audience.   
Table 4 presents feedback on the proposed changes for the use of PHI data on HSNs and the potential 
reduction of risks from the user perspective. 
 
Participant ID Changes for PHI protection – the user perspective 
FG2:F2 “If there was a real legal backing to the protection of information … I’d be more comfortable, 
but I don’t think legally there is.”   
 “also, accountability. If this information that you are entering is being used, is going to be 
used for a purpose, for something it was not intended, who is going to be accountable and 
what will the consequences be?” 
FG2:F1 “To have different levels of access and you can share with people like that.” 
FG3:M2 “At the very minimum, an opt in to sharing, not automatically opt into it.” 
FG1:F3 “If there was an on-boarding process to tell you – this is what you are signing up for - … so 
that you are aware and then it’s your choice to complete it or walk away.” 
FG1:M2 “I think it would be better to see who’s viewed your profile, who’s viewed what health prob-
lems you have.” 
FG2:M2 “They (the PP and T&Cs) should be legally decoded, and be brief to be absorbed.” 
FG1:M3 “I think it’s much easier if it is simple language, text, saying what they actually intend to do 
with what you have put onto the social network.” 
Table 4. Protection options for PHI data on HSNs. 
Moving forward, it is apparent that although users are currently exposing their PHI data to little un-
derstood levels of risk, when their levels of awareness are raised the user response is quite clear – “to 
provide us (the user) with the tools, knowledge and ability to control the risk levels that our PHI data 
could be exposed to”.   
4 Discussion 
The aim of this research was to explore users’ behaviours when providing eConsent on a HSN.  With 
the focus on users’ engagement and judgement of risk for their PHI (or lack thereof) based on their 
interaction with the T&Cs and PP statements on the HSN. Findings suggest that a privacy paradox 
exists for some participants in this group by simply “ticking agree” to eConsent on registration to this 
HSN. So, are users taking the dark risks of sharing PHI data in online communities seriously? Prior 
experience has taught users that ‘ticking agree’ offers access to sites, so whether you agree with the 
sites T&Cs and PP statements or not, any concerns you might have are easily overridden when the 
motivation or drive to get access to a service is high. It can be stated that these users were taking dark 
risks with their PHI data at time of eConsent, but were content with this risk homeostasis.  It was only 
when users reflected on the potential security risks for their PHI data, after registration and upon re-
flection, that the potential dark risks were consciously considered and dissatisfaction emerged. Re-
search participants then presented a clear picture of their future requirements in service design - they 
would like to regain control over the access and use of their data by HSN sites (a summary illustration 
of findings is provided in Appendix A – Figure 1).   
The darker side of risk taking in online HSN communities has been illustrated by users in this re-
search. There was a lack of user motivation to read the T&Cs and PP information in their current 
form. There was also the issue of security risk consequences being too distant from users’ compre-
hension, resulting in the immediate action of “ticking agree”.  The expenditure of effort required for 
the end user to fully engage with the current presentation of T&Cs and PP statements (lengthy, text 
heavy documents) has a detrimental effect on intention behaviours – in other words, discouraging us-
ers from information seeking to enable eConsent to be a truly informed choice. Findings from this 
research are in line with a consumer report that states ‘Users do want more control over the collection 
and use of their data’ (Center, September 2008).  However, offering users more control in isolation 
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from other steps (such as education and regulation) would not be a panacea for all ills. To move for-
ward there is a need to increase user awareness on the potential benefits of using cautious behaviours 
– securing the integrity and confidentiality of their online PHI data. 
Every research study has limitations; this also applies here. The sample size of participants that took 
part in this study could be criticised as being too small or too restrictive to be generalisable. However, 
given the exploratory nature of this study, the primary objective was to gain insight into user views 
and perceptions of the HSN eConsent process, and examine the risks for users joining such a commu-
nity.  The use of qualitative methods has provided a greater understanding of “the other” or “the HSN 
user” views and has provided illuminating findings. Using mock profiles may have distanced users 
from inquiring about privacy risks for their PHI data, however the rationale for this was to protect 
participants’ privacy whilst taking part in this study.   
5 Conclusion 
The next steps for this research will delve further into users’ needs when providing eConsent on HSN 
platforms and will focus on assisting the user through the exploration of the design of privacy com-
munication for service users. With new laws on the horizon in the form of the European-wide data 
protection legislation (GDPR) in 2018, movement is afoot to improve the protection of users’ online 
data.  As such the user is centre focus in terms of improving data protection.   
This research contributes new insights on how eConsent within HSNs could be designed to increase 
users’ understanding and awareness of the use of their PHI use while minimising the risks the end-
users. For developers of mobile applications (e.g. HSNs) who face increasing pressure to address in-
formation privacy issues due to the introduction of GDPR, this study provides practical guidance on 
how the eConsent process could be enhanced. Users should be educated on the potential risks for their 
shared PHI data and how to minimise these dark risks; there must be a more emphasised focus on the 
regulation of eConsent by the introduction of legislation; or in the redesign of the eConsent process 
on HSN platforms, perhaps moving to a dynamic consent process or incorporating a movement to 
privacy-by-design in the creation of these online communities. The design of eConsent on HSN plat-
forms needs to move forward, by improving the clarity on PHI sharing risks and security issues, in-
forming the end user by making it easier for them to comprehend these potential consequences. This 
must come in the form of education increasing user awareness and IT literacy, so that decision mak-
ing on risk taking is on a truly informed consent basis. When users become more informed partici-
pants in the eConsent process, it is more likely that a behavioural change will result – users becoming 
more confident at selecting the sharing levels for their PHI data. A confident user is an informed par-
ticipant in protecting their online data, reducing any sense of regret on a decision to join and moving 
the HSN user to the brighter side of online sharing.  
From a theoretical perspective, this study highlights that some individuals maintain an acceptable de-
gree of risk that is self-levelling, i.e. risk homeostasis. In exploring this phenomenon, this research 
extends existing behavioural-based literature by highlighting the need to explore risk homeostasis as a 
factor or an influential theory in the Information Systems field. Moreover, this study addresses an un-
der-investigated area of research focusing on the electronic consent process. In doing so, this research 
addresses a broader challenge of how to ensure that citizens are aware and understand how their da-
ta/information is stored, processed and used in this digital age. 
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Figure 1.   Summary illustration of findings from this study. 
